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Abstract—To ensure seamless communications between mobile 
Electric Vehicles (EVs) and EV power supply equipment, support 
for ubiquitous and transparent mobile IP communications is 
essential in Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) networks. However, it initiates 
a range of privacy-related challenges as it is possible to track 
connected EVs through their mobile IP addresses. Recent works 
are mostly dedicated to solving authentication and privacy issues 
in V2G networks in general. Yet, they do not tackle the security 
and privacy challenges resulting from enabling mobile IP 
communications. To address these challenges, this paper proposes 
an Efficient, Secure and Privacy-preserving Proxy Mobile IPv6 
(ESP-PMIPv6) protocol for the protection of mobile IP 
communications in V2G networks. ESP-PMIPv6 enables 
authorised EVs to acquire a mobile IPv6 address and access the 
V2G network in a secure and privacy-preserving manner. While 
ESP-PMIPv6 offers mutual authentication, identity anonymity 
and location unlinkability for the mobile EVs, it also achieves 
authorised traceability of misbehaving EVs through a novel 
collaborative tracking scheme. Formal and informal security 
analyses are conducted to prove that ESP-PMIPv6 meets these 
security and privacy goals. In addition, via a simulated assessment, 
the ESP-PMIPv6 is proven to achieve low authentication latency, 
low handover delay, and low packet loss rate in comparison with 
the PMIPv6 protocol. 
 
Index Terms—Electric vehicles; Smart grids; Security; Privacy; 
Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6); Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) Networks 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
EHICLE-TO-GRID (V2G) networks have emerged in the 
last decade as a new communication paradigm between 
electric vehicles (EVs) and the Smart Grid (SG). V2G networks 
provide charging and value-added services to EVs and 
empower the vision of clean and smart energy distribution in 
smart cities. Given the projected growing number of EVs, a 
variety of residential/public electric vehicle supply equipment 
(EVSE) (i.e., charging spots) must be widely available and easy 
to reach to support a smooth operation of V2G networks. 
With the utilisation of several access technologies such as 
Power Line Communications (PLC), IEEE 802.11p, and LTE 
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mobile communications, EVs can communicate with the 
charging infrastructure to: i) initiate a charging session; ii) 
negotiate and access the information required for the next 
charging/discharging schedule; and iii) terminate a charging 
session and receive billing information. The communication 
interface between an EV and an EVSE in V2G networks is not 
holistically settled yet as parts of the current standards such as 
ISO 15118 [1] and SAE J2836 [2] are either under development 
(e.g., SAE J2836/6) or under review (e.g., ISO 15118-2:2014 
[3]). 
The ISO 15118-2 standard states that the IPv6 protocol is 
mandatory for acquiring an IP address and enabling TCP/IP 
communication for information exchange during the charging 
process of a given EV [1, 4]. Since an EV may require charging 
services at different geographical locations (e.g., while moving 
from its home network to visiting networks), the SG operator or 
the mobility operator should be able to keep track of the mobile 
EV and route it to a suitable EVSE. Thus, it is essential to 
maintain seamless communications between the EV and 
EVSEs. However, anonymity and location-privacy 
mechanisms should be applied to maintain the security and 
privacy of EVs and their users. At the same time, it is necessary 
to establish a link between an EV and its charging/discharging 
operations to ensure accountability and authorised traceability 
should an EV misbehave or abuse the service. 
Although support for ubiquitous and transparent mobile IP 
communications is essential in V2G networks to maintain the 
smooth operation of its services, it can bring several security 
and privacy concerns. Enabling IP communications is one of 
the main reasons that V2G networks are vulnerable to attacks 
such as message tampering, impersonation, repudiation and 
location tracking [5]. Once a two-way TCP/IP communication 
between an EV and an EVSE is established, there is no technical 
limitation to the amount and type of data that could be obtained 
from the EV. Such data includes the EV’s location, identity, 
state of charge, charging preferences, and driver-oriented 
personal data [6]. Thus, tracking locations and infiltrating the 
privacy and anonymity of the EV’s user through the EV’s 
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mobile IP address is quite easy in this context. 
While the aspects of authentication, anonymity and privacy-
preserving communications in vehicular and V2G networks 
have been addressed in the literature (see [7–18]), to the best of 
the authors’ knowledge, no previous work has addressed the 
security and privacy concerns of enabling mobile IP 
communications in V2G networks. Given the centralised nature 
of charging services in V2G networks, a network-based IP 
mobility protocol such as the Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) 
protocol [19] can be seen as a reasonable option [20] for 
handling EV mobility during several charging sessions. 
Nonetheless, the current implementation of PMIPv6 is prone to 
several security and privacy threats such as impersonation, man 
in the middle, and location tracking attacks. Moreover, it has 
relatively long authentication latency during an EV’s handover 
as explained later in Section III-B. 
To rectify the above problems, a secure and privacy-aware 
PMIPv6 (SP-PMIPv6) protocol for V2G networks was 
developed in [21]. SP-PMIPv6 achieved the security and 
location privacy of EVs using certificate-less public key 
cryptography (CL-PKC) and restrictive partially blind signature 
(RPBS) techniques. However, these techniques are 
algorithmically complex and computationally intensive and 
hence incur high implementation costs. Besides, SP-PMIPv6 
focused on a centralised security solution that resulted in high 
communication overhead every time an EV wants to refresh its 
pass to access the V2G network. Moreover, it lacks on 
misbehaviour traceability that is important for deterring 
“malicious” EVs from misusing the protocol to evade their 
responsibilities for illegal actions. 
To overcome the above weaknesses and alleviate the security 
and privacy concerns of EVs’ users, this paper introduces an 
Efficient, Secure and Privacy-preserving PMIPv6 (ESP-
PMIPv6) protocol for V2G communications, which is a 
significantly improved and extended version of the work in 
[21]. ESP-PMIPv6 employs public key cryptography in 
synergy with an RSA-based blind signature technique, and 
identity traceability and location unlinkability mechanisms for 
a balanced and strong provision of efficiency, security and 
privacy. This paper aids the aspect of security and privacy of 
mobile IP communications in V2G networks with the following 
five novel contributions: 
1) The ESP-PMIPv6 protocol utilises a novel built-in tagging 
scheme in an RSA-based blind signature to issue an access 
pass to an EV. This pass allows an EV to anonymously 
access a mobile IP-enabled V2G network. At the same 
time, it prevents any network entity from tracking or 
profiling the EV’s real identity while moving using its 
acquired mobile IP address. 
2) A new proxy-based distributed and collaborative approach 
to generating access pass trees for each legitimate EV is 
proposed for the ESP-PMIPv6 protocol. This allows an EV 
to generate new passes under different identifiers using its 
current valid access pass. Consequently, the approach 
achieves stronger location unlinkability and better 
workload distribution among the authentication and 
traceability servers used. 
3) ESP-PMIPv6 provides a new mechanism for dedicated 
authorities to initiate a collaborative misbehaviour 
traceability process for tracking down a misbehaving EV 
to reveal its identity and location information. They can 
either initiate a backward trace (i.e., find out the EV’s real 
identity using its access pass) or a forward trace (i.e., given 
an EV’s real identity, find out the locations it has visited). 
4) ESP-PMIPv6 achieves a balanced implementation of the 
security and privacy goals for a mobile IP-enabled V2G 
network, including mutual authentication between an EV 
and the network entities, protection against replay, man in 
the middle, message tampering and impersonation attacks, 
and EV anonymity and untraceability. 
5) The developed ESP-PMIPv6 protocol allows much more 
efficient access pass authentication and strengthens the 
aspect of seamless handover with a relatively low 
authentication delay and low computational complexity. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II 
reviews the related works in the literature. Section III presents 
the preliminaries relevant to the paper. Section IV describes the 
PMIPv6-enabled V2G network scenario considered for the 
ESP-PMIPv6 protocol design. Section V presents the 
developed ESP-PMIPv6 protocol operations in detail. Section 
VI provides the security and privacy analysis of the protocol. 
Section VII covers the performance evaluation of ESP-
PMIPv6. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Aspects of security, privacy and traceability in V2G 
networks have been addressed in different contexts throughout 
the literature (see [7–15]). Given the fact that this work is 
directly related to the PMIPv6 protocol, only the most 
significant studies on the improvement of the protocol and its 
variations are reviewed and compared below.  
Chaung et al. in [22] have proposed a secure password-based 
authentication mechanism for seamless handover in PMIPv6 
networks called SPAM. A mobile node (MN) registers with an 
Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting (AAA) server to 
receive authentication credentials on a smart card. When an MN 
joins a Local Mobility Domain (LMD), the user inserts its smart 
card and keys in its identity and password to get authentication 
credentials. These credentials are utilised to perform a mutual 
authentication with a Mobile Access Gateway (MAG). Chaung 
et al. integrated SPAM with a bicasting scheme to avoid packet 
loss problems while performing handover. The authors 
assumed that the smart cards are tamper-proof; however, most 
of them are not as shown in [23]. Besides, smart cards are 
vulnerable to loss and/or theft, and also SPAM is susceptible to 
password guessing attacks.  
Kong et al. in [24] and [25] utilised the AAA infrastructure 
to authenticate a given MN in PMIPv6 networks. However, 
both works inherit high packet loss and inefficient 
authentication problems during handover. In this paper, the 




latency caused by the AAA server is overcome, since an EV 
executes only a single AAA authentication phase when it first 
joins the V2G network and subsequently the introduced pass is 
used. Hence, the (re)authentication latency is avoided during 
any handover while the EV joins a new MAG. Lee and Chung 
[26] proposed two secure authentication procedures for 
PMIPv6, but similar to Kong et al., they did not consider the 
handover procedure. In particular, their handover was still 
based on the original PMIPv6 procedure that naturally results 
in high handover authentication latency. 
 In [27], Kang et al. proposed an enhanced user 
authentication scheme in PMIPv6 networks to overcome the 
shortcomings of the smartcard-based authentication scheme 
developed by Alizadeh et al. [28]. Alizadeh’s scheme involves 
three stages: i) registration phase where a user keys in its 
password into the smartcard that communicates with the AAA 
server to register; ii) mutual authentication phase where the 
smartcard (i.e., MN) and a MAG authenticate each other; and 
iii) password change phase where the user can change its 
password in the smartcard and repeat the process. According to 
Kang et al., Alizadeh’s scheme is vulnerable to offline 
password guessing, MN and/or MAG impersonation, and 
session-key-derived attacks. Hence, they proposed an 
enhancement that uses biometric information and a dynamic 
identity to mitigate the security drawbacks of Alizadeh’s 
scheme. Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, smart cards are not 
tamper-proof and vulnerable to loss and/or theft. Besides that, 
neither of these two schemes proposed a mechanism for an 
authorised traceability should the MN misbehave. 
Taha and Shen have proposed an anonymous and location 
privacy-preserving scheme (ALPP) for mobile IPv6 
heterogeneous networks [29]. ALPP includes two subschemes: 
1) anonymous home binding update to add anonymity and 
location privacy to mobile IPv6 binding updates; and 2) 
anonymous return routability to protect the anonymity of return 
routability control messages. The authors utilised onion routing 
to repeatedly encrypt the transmitted messages at each 
intermediate node to achieve location privacy of mobile nodes. 
To authenticate a MN to its foreign gateway and keep the 
computational cost of the certificate management process 
minimised, ALPP uses CL-PKC. However, the utilisation of 
onion routing in ALPP makes it computationally expensive. 
Besides that, many works have shown the susceptibility of 
onion routing when adversaries have access to large fractions 
of its input-output links [30]. 
As already mentioned, the work in [21] aimed to overcome 
the aforementioned constraints from the literature. However, 
there were still issues of computational complexity within the 
generation of the RPBS-based pass, whereas the herein reported 
work (as clearly described in Section V) is much simpler and 
more efficient. Moreover, the work in [21] was mainly targeting 
a centralised security scheme where the capabilities of pass 
tagging, proxy-based distributed pass issuing and misbehaved 
EV tracking are not considered. 
In contrast to the above, the approach presented in this paper 
operates in a distributed fashion to accomplish these new 
capabilities. It allows an EV to utilise a valid pass to acquire 
other passes for use at different MAGs. These anonymous and 
apparently unlinked passes strengthen the preservation of the 
EV’s identity and location privacy, if it does not misbehave. 
Otherwise, tags embedded in the passes help an authority to 
revoke the EV’s privacy protection by tracking down its real 
identity, used passes and visited MAGs to construct a trace of 
activities for the investigation of its misbehaviour. Such 
traceability can deter the misuse of the services offered by the 
new ESP-PMIPv6 protocol. 
III. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, the RSA-based blind signature scheme and 
the basic PMIPv6 protocol operations in V2G networks are 
introduced. The main notations used throughout this paper are 
given in Table I.  
A. RSA-based Blind Signature 
The first RSA-based blind signature scheme was proposed in 
[31] to enable a requester R to obtain a signature on a message 
m without revealing anything about m to the signing authority 
(SA). This provides message anonymity to R. Let N be a large 
public parameter defined by SA, and (PK, SK) be its public and 
private keys, respectively. The requester R generates a random 
number r ∈ ℤ𝑁∗ , computes m` ≡ m∙rPK (mod N) where rPK is a 
blinding factor and m < N, and sends m` to SA. Upon receiving 
the message, SA computes S` ≡ (m`)SK (mod N) and sends S` to 
R. Based on received S`, R calculates S ≡ S`∙r-1 (mod N) ≡ 
(m`)SK∙r-1 (mod N) ≡ mSK∙rPK·SK∙r-1 (mod N) ≡ mSK (mod N), 
which is SA’s signature on m. Here, r∙r-1 ≡ 1 (mod N) and rPK∙SK 
≡ r (mod N). 
B. PMIPv6 Protocol in V2G Networks 
The EV mobility is handled within a PMIPv6 LMD through 
the following network entities [19]: 1) the Local Mobility 
TABLE I – NOTATIONS 
m A message 
N A large public parameter  
CA Certificate Authority 
TS Traceability Server 
PK, SK A pair of public/private keys 
r A random number where r  ℤ𝑁∗  
Ppub The public key of a certificate authority (CA) 
H(∙) A secure hash function 
Enc(∙)  A symmetric encryption function 
PKE(∙) A public key encryption function 
M The access pass template 
TPKEV1, TSKEV1 The temporary public/private keys of EV1 
T A ticket 
 The requested access pass expiration time 
Skey A random symmetric session key 
PI A unique access pass identifier 
TC The terms and conditions of the provided service 
 TS’s signature on M and TPKEV1 
PID A random pseudo identity 
d Random delay during the handover process 
λ Arrival rate of EVs at a MAG 
 
 




Anchor (LMA); 2) the MAGs; and 3) the AAA Server. 
LMA maintains binding cache entries for tracking the 
locations of EVs in its domain and directs traffic intended for 
them towards their current locations. MAGs are responsible for 
performing the mobility signalling with LMA on behalf of EVs. 
Finally, the AAA server is responsible for authenticating EVs 
and authorising them to access the LMD. Fig. 1 shows the 
PMIPv6 signalling flow when EV1 joins the LMD and 
performs a handover from MAG1 to MAG2. The 
Corresponding Node (CN) in Fig. 1 could be any entity in the 
SG charging infrastructure such as a central aggregator (CAG), 
charging and billing server, etc. The messages utilised in this 
process are: Router Solicitation (RS), Proxy Binding Update 
(PBU), Proxy Binding Acknowledgment (PBA), and Router 
Advertisement (RA). 
 
Fig. 1. PMIPv6 Signalling Flow in V2G Network [21] 
IV. PMIPV6-ENABLED VEHICLE-TO-GRID (V2G) NETWORK 
A. System Model 
The V2G network model considered in this paper is 
illustrated in Fig. 2. It is assumed that the PMIPv6-enabled V2G 
network (i.e., the LMD) serves a city, which represents a local 
SG. This model is targeted at personal EVs and does not include 
other electric forms of transportation such as electric buses. The 
investigation of a wider V2G network model is outside the 
scope of this paper and left for future work. 
When EV1 acquires an IPv6 address, it can retain this address 
as long as it is moving within the LMD. It should be noted that 
the Traceability Server (TS) in Fig. 2 is not part of the standard 
PMIPv6 scenario. Thus, it has no access to the PMIPv6 network 
and only communicates with AAA through a secure channel. 
Note that there is only one TS in the network. TS is added to 
provide traceability in the proposed ESP-PMIPv6 protocol as to 
be explained later in Sections V and VI. It is assumed that a 
trusted third party (i.e., neither the SG operator nor the mobility 
operator) manages the TS. 
In Fig. 2, MAGs, LMA and AAA are managed either by the 
SG operator or a mobility operator, which handles 
communications in the SG. LMA keeps track of the location of 
EV1 and directs its data traffic to the corresponding MAG. 
MAGs do not maintain binding cache entries for mobile EVs. 
The TS and AAA server keep certain information regarding the 
requested access passes from EVs for traceability purposes, as 
to be explained later in Section V. 
To maintain session continuity and preserve the service 
context between EV1 and the CN, EV1 should keep the same 
IPv6 address while moving among different networks. In this 
way, the data from CN can be routed to EV1 through the LMA 
to the MAG it is attached to. However, once the current service 
session is over, EV1 can acquire a new IPv6 address to achieve 
a higher level of location unlinkability. 
Finally, each EV that wishes to access the LMD has to follow 
TC, the terms and conditions of the provided service. TC is 
publicly known by every entity in the system and defines the 
validity scope of the access being granted to an EV to prevent 
it from being abused for any other purposes. 
B. System Security & Key Management Assumptions 
It is assumed that the communication between LMA and a 
MAG is protected using IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload 
(ESP) in transport mode with mandatory integrity protection 
[19]. A certificate authority (CA) exists and is trusted by all 
entities in the system. Each entity in the system is assumed to 
have a certificate Cert, which contains its identity and public 
key issued by CA. The CA publishes the system parameters 
(Ppub, PKAAA, PKTS, H, Enc(∙)), where Ppub is CA’s public key, 
PKAAA and PKTS are the public keys of AAA and TS, 
respectively, H is a secure hash function such as SHA-3, and 
Enc(∙) is a symmetric encryption algorithm. Moreover, over the 
secure channel between them, TS and AAA are mutually 
authenticated to each other prior to the system start. 
Each MAG in the system is assumed to be verified through 
its CertMAG and registered at the AAA server. These MAGs are 
authorised to act as proxies for TS or AAA for the purpose of 
issuing access pass trees, as to be explained later in Section V-
D. AAA delivers the list of all legitimate MAGs in the system 
to MAGs, and EVs when they register to access the LMD, as to 
be explained in Section V-B. If this list is updated (e.g., new 
authorised MAGs are added, or a MAG updates its key), MAGs 
will receive the updated list from AAA while EVs will get the 
list when they renew their access passes. If a MAG is revoked 
from the MAG list for being compromised or distrusted, AAA 
broadcasts the revoked MAG(s) to all other MAGs to avoid any 
passes issued by the revoked MAG(s). In this case, EVs that 
possess any passes issued by the revoked MAG(s) can no longer 
use them but can still use their original access pass or passes 
issued by other MAGs. Hence, their access to the LMD will not 
be interrupted. 
If TS and/or AAA decide to update their keys, the CA will 
publish an updated list of the system parameters to all entities 
in the system. To minimise the effect of this change to the 
current issued access passes, the update process is expected to 
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take effect overnight. Besides that, this update is assumed to be 
infrequent given the nature of the TS and AAA servers’ roles 
and their security measures. It is worth noting that EVs’ access 
pass validity is limited to 24 hours, as explained later. In 
addition, an old key pair and its updated one are allowed to 
coexist for up to 24 hours. During this short period, the old key 
pair can still be used for the verification of the previously 
created access passes but it cannot be used to issue new passes. 
Only the updated key pair is allowed to issue and verify new 
access passes. After the coexisting period, all the previously 
created access passes are expired, so the old key pair becomes 
invalid. Hence, the effect of updating the PK and SK keys of 
AAA, TS, and even MAGs on the previously created access 
passes is kept minimal. 
Note that in case a key pair needs to be revoked immediately 
without the above coexisting period, the MAG revocation case 
discussed earlier can be applied to invalidate all relevant passes 
even if they have not expired. 
C. Threat Model 
In Fig. 2, any network entity can be considered as an 
adversary if it misbehaves or deviates from its legitimate 
operations. Due to the openness of wireless communications 
and the deployment of MAGs in an unfenced environment, two 
types of adversary are considered here: external and internal. 
An external adversary is an entity outside the network that 
can capture messages and analyse packets transmitted between 
the communicating entities to spot their identities, track their 
locations, and reveal the contents of transmitted packets if it 
possesses the corresponding decryption keys. Thus, it can 
perform attacks such as man in the middle, replay, message 
tampering, and impersonation. An internal adversary is an 
entity within the network (e.g., a compromised MAG), or a 
misbehaving EV, which engages in similar illicit activities. A 
misbehaving EV can perform a repudiation attack to evade its 
responsibilities (e.g., not paying for consumed power) and 
abuse the service. 
The following assumptions are made in the threat model 
adopted. First, the LMA, TS and AAA server are semi-trusted 
in the sense that they always perform their assigned operations 
correctly and do not collude directly or indirectly for illicit 
operations. However, they may misbehave independently, and 
even collude with some MAGs and EVs, for gathering EVs’ 
private information. Secondly, MAGs always keep correct EV 
records required, which will be specified in the next section, 
and offer authorised access to them. However, MAGs may 
conspire with other MAGs and EVs in addition to the collusion 
in the first assumption. 
V. EFFICIENT, SECURE & PRIVACY-PRESERVING PMIPV6 
(ESP-PMIPV6) PROTOCOL 
A. ESP-PMIPv6 Security and Privacy Objectives 
To protect an EV’s privacy and prevent possible attacks due 
to enabling mobile IP communications in V2G networks, the 
following main security, privacy and performance requirements 
are imposed: 
1) Mutual authentication between the EV and the network 
entities including the AAA server, TS, and MAGs to 
prevent impersonation attacks and unauthorised access to 
the mobility domain. 
2) Anonymity and location privacy for all mobile EVs. No 
entity in the network including LMA, AAA, TS and MAGs 
is able to illegitimately reveal an EV’s real identity or track 
its locations using its acquired mobile IPv6 address. 
Moreover, external adversaries should not be able to spot 
the EV’s ID from intercepted messages. 
3) Message integrity and confidentiality. All the transmitted 
messages among the network entities must be protected 
against replay attacks or exposing an EV’s real identity or 
 
Fig. 2. PMIPv6-enabled V2G Network 





4) Forward and Backward traceability. An authorised entity 
should be able to trace an EV’s real identity using its access 
pass should that EV misbehave. Moreover, given an access 
pass, an authorised entity should be able to find a full trace 
of the EV’s movements within the mobility domain. 
5) Low computation complexity and authentication latency 
especially during handover to ensure seamless 
communications between EVs and the SG. 
B. Access Pass Generation 
To join a LMD, each EV must register its identity with the 
AAA server and request an anonymous access pass. The pass is 
only used to access the PMIPv6-enabled V2G network, whereas 
the aspects of billing and rewarding related to the 
charging/discharging processes are handled after establishing 
the IP connection. In the following, the steps needed to generate 
an anonymous access pass for an EV, denoted as EV1, are 
described, which are also illustrated in Fig. 3 with message 
validation details omitted for easier understanding: 
 
Fig. 3. ESP-PMIPv6 – Access Pass Generation Process 
1) EV1 fills in an access pass template M tied to the terms and 
conditions TC of the provided service. Then, it generates a 
pair of temporary public and private keys (TPKEV1, 
TSKEV1), and computes a ≡ h∙rPKTS (mod N), where h = H(M 
|| TPKEV1) and r ∈ ℤ𝑁∗  is a random number. Based on a, it 
formulates a ticket T = {a, } where  is the requested 
access pass expiration time. Note that  is chosen by EV1 
from a list of available times offered by AAA. This means 
that multiple access passes are likely to have the same 
expiration time, so  cannot be used to track down a 
particular EV by adversaries. It is assumed that  is limited 
to 24h. This is essential to make sure that the issued access 
pass will expire quickly and thus require EV1 to renew it. 
In this way, it becomes even harder for adversaries to track 
down a particular EV through its current access pass as to 
be discussed in Section VI. 
Afterwards, EV1 computes K = PKE(PKTS, Skey), where 
Skey is a random symmetric session key and PKTS is TS’s 
public key. EV1 then sends its request PKE(PKAAA, 
{CertEV1, T, K, t1, SignEV1(H(CertEV1 || T || K || t1))}) to AAA. 
Here, CertEV1 is EV1’s public key certificate, t1 is a 
timestamp, and SignEV1 is EV1’s signature on CertEV1, T, K 
and t1. 
2) Having validated the received request via CertEV1 and 
SignEV1, AAA chooses a unique session label L and saves 
{L, IDTS, IDEV1, t1, SignEV1(H(CertEV1 || T || K || t1))} in its 
records, where IDTS and IDEV1 are the identities of TS and 
EV1, respectively. Recording EV1’s signature SignEV1 is 
essential for holding it accountable for the access pass 
request. In case EV1 misbehaves, the record can be used to 
track it down as will be detailed in Section VI-D. 
Afterwards, AAA submits PKE(PKTS, {L, T, K, t2, 
SignAAA(H(L || T || K || t2))}) to TS for the issuance of the 
requested access pass. 
3) After the successful validation of the received request via 
SignAAA, TS yields a unique access pass identifier PI and 
applies T = {a, } to compute c = H(TC ||  || PI). 
Afterwards, TS computes σ ≡ ac∙SKTS (mod N), and extracts 
Skey from K with its private key SKTS. Similar to AAA, TS 
records {L, IDAAA, PI, T, K, t2, SignAAA(H(L || T || K || t2))} 
for traceability purposes. TS creates Resp = {Enc(Skey, {σ, 
PI}), SignTS(H(Enc(Skey, {σ, PI}) || ))}. Finally, TS sends 
PKE(PKAAA, {L, Resp, t3, SignTS(H(L || Resp || t3))}) to 
AAA. 
4) Upon the message reception and successful validation via 
its signature, AAA transfers PKE(PKEV1, {CertAAA, t4, Resp, 
SignAAA(H(CertAAA || Resp || t4))}) to EV1. 
5) EV1 decrypts the received message using SKEV1 and Skey 
and then validates it via SignAAA and SignTS. If positive, it 
calculates  ≡ σ∙r-c ≡ ac∙SKTS ∙ r-c ≡ (h∙rPKTS) c∙SKTS ∙ r-c ≡ h c∙SKTS 
(mod N), which is TS’s signature on M and TPKEV1 due to 
h = H(M || TPKEV1). This signature is tagged with PI 
through c for EV1’s traceability, and its validity is 
restricted by TC and  included in c. The access pass for 
EV1 is thus passEV1 = {IDTS, M, TPKEV1, , , PI}. 
Note that EV1’s keys (TPKEV1, TSKEV1) are uniquely 
associated with its passEV1, as TPKEV1 is certified via h by TS 
although it does not know the key. This allows EV1 to use the 
keys for authentic communications with MAGs as to be shown 
below. It should also be noted that (TPKEV1, TSKEV1) are not 
used during this process (i.e., communications with the AAA 
and TS servers) to make sure that EV1’s anonymity is 
maintained, and traceability will only be possible via the 
PKE(PKAAA, {CertEV1, T, K, t1, 
SignEV1(H(CertEV1 || T || K || t1))}) 
h = H(M || TPKEV1) 
a ≡ h rPKTS (mod N) 
T = {a, } 
K = PKE(PKTS, Skey) 
Save {L, IDTS, IDEV1, t1, 
SignEV1(H(CertEV1 || T || K || t1))} 
PKE(PKTS, {L, T, K, t2, 
SignAAA(H(L || T || K || t2))}) 
c = H(TC ||  || PI) 
σ ≡ ac∙SKTS (mod N) 
Save {L, IDAAA, PI, T, K, t2, 
SignAAA(H(L || T || K || t2))} 
Resp = {Enc(Skey, {σ, PI}),  
SignTS(H(Enc (Skey, {σ, PI}) ||  ))} 
PKE(PKEV1, {CertAAA , t4, Resp,  
SignAAA(H(CertAAA || Resp || t4))}) 
 ≡ σ∙r-c ≡ ac∙SKTS r-c ≡  
(h rPKTS ) c∙SKTS  ∙ r-c ≡ 
h c∙SKTS (mod N)  
EV1 AAA TS 
PKE(PKAAA , {L, Resp, t3, 
SignTS(H(L || Resp || t3))}) 




mechanism to be explained later. EV1 can change this pair of 
keys for each new access pass. 
C. Establishing Mobility Sessions & Handover Processes 
When EV1 attaches to a MAG denoted as MAG1, it 
generates a random pseudo identity PID1, which is produced 
every time EV1 attaches to a new MAG. EV1 then sends 
PKE(PKMAG1, {PID1, passEV1, t5, SignEV1`(H(PID1 || passEV1 || 
t5))}) within the RS message to MAG1. Note that EV1 uses 
TSKEV1 to generate SignEV1` and it does not send its long-term 
public key certificate to MAG1. 
Following the reception and decryption of the RS message, 
MAG1 confirms that passEV1 is not expired and M follows the 
correct template as follows. MAG1 computes c = H(TC ||  || 
PI) and h`= H(M || TPKEV1). It checks if PKTS ≡ h`c (mod N) 
holds. If yes, then passEV1 is verified and EV1 is authenticated 
and authorised to join LMD. Subsequently, MAG1 sends a PBU 
message to LMA, which contains PID1. LMA creates a new 
binding entry for PID1 and sends back a PBA message to 
MAG1. MAG1 then saves {PID1, passEV1, t5, SignEV1`(H(PID1 
|| passEV1 || t5))} for the traceability purposes, and sends 
PKE(TPKEV1, {CertMAG1, HNP, t6, SignMAG1(H(CertMAG1 || HNP 
|| t6))}) within the RA message to EV1 where HNP is the Home 
Network Prefix. Finally, EV1 validates the received message, 
authenticates MAG1 via its signature and configures its IPv6 
address using HNP. The above process is illustrated in Fig. 4 
with the message validation or authentication details omitted 
for easier understanding. 
Now, data from the CN can be routed to EV1 based on the 
newly created binding entry at LMA that points to MAG1, 
where EV1 under pseudo identity PID1 is currently attached. 
Note that routing data packets is based on LMA’s advertisement 
of reachability of that network prefix, as shown in Fig. 2. 
Later on, as shown in Fig. 4, an authentication is performed 
when EV1 moves to a new location, detaches from MAG1 and 
uses a new PID2 to attach to another MAG signified as MAG2. 
In this case, a new access pass passEV1` might be used along 
with PID2, which will be discussed further in the next sub-
section. It can be observed in Fig. 4 that the transmission of the 
De-PBU and De-PBA messages between MAG1 and LMA is 
delayed by a random value d. This is done to deter the LMA 
capability to link the deregistered PID1 with the newly 
registered PID2. Therefore, within d, LMA maintains two 
entries with different PIDs for EV1 while, to LMA, they appear 
as two different identities of two different EVs. Note that within 
d, data packets from the CN will be routed to both MAG1 and 
MAG2 while EV1 is only attached to MAG2, causing extra 
resource consumption. However, d is assigned a very small 
value to keep the delayed deregistration impact minimum on 
the network performance. Once the deregistration is complete, 
data will be routed based on the only record LMA has for EV1 
under PID2. In this way, the CN can keep the communication 
session with EV1 during and after the handover from MAG1 to 
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While not communicating with AAA, as shown in Fig. 4, the 
protocol reduces the communication overhead during the 
handover, but some security issues could arise in case a MAG 
is compromised. As mentioned earlier, the list of MAGs is 
updated and disseminated by AAA to EVs when they 
register/renew their passes. It is possible that EV1 
communicates with a compromised MAG that is not spotted yet 
by AAA. On one hand, the impact of such a MAG on EV1 is 
very limited since the compromised MAG will be able to 
neither reveal the real identity of EV1 nor benefit from stealing 
its pass, as to be detailed later in Sections VI-B and VI-C. On 
the other hand, EV1 could be denied access to the LMD by the 
compromised MAG. To mitigate this problem, AAA or the 
mobility operator could observe the operations of MAGs 
periodically to ensure they are not compromised. The 
investigation of this solution is outside the scope of this paper 
and left for future work. 
D. Access Pass Trees  
ESP-PMIPv6 allows an EV to utilise its valid access pass to 
apply for new passes with different identifiers. This enables the 
EV to use different passes at different MAGs, which makes the 
illegitimate linkage of the EV’s identities and locations much 
harder, so as to achieve higher levels of privacy protection and 
anonymity.  
Note that the EV can simply repeat the access pass issuing 
process in Fig. 3 to obtain multiple passes from AAA. However, 
this centralised solution is likely to lead to a bottleneck problem 
at AAA, which causes delays to the access pass issuing, when 
it receives a large number of pass requests. Thus, a distributed 
approach is proposed below for generating a tree of new access 
passes for the EV from its valid pass granted by AAA. 
The main idea underpinning the approach is to allow the 
authorised MAGs to act as a proxy of AAA or TS to issue new 
access passes from a valid pass of the EV without any 
involvement of AAA and TS. Hence, such pass generation does 
not incur extra workloads on AAA or TS and allows the 
workloads to be distributed among the authorised MAGs. Also, 
adding these MAGs to the issuance of access passes makes the 
illicit linkage of the EV’s identities and locations even more 
difficult, because such linkage necessitates the compromise of 
more network entities such as the MAGs. 
More specifically, after the EV has successfully attached to 
a MAG via the process in Fig. 4 using a valid access pass, it can 
request the MAG for a new pass if needed. In this case, the 
MAG serves as a proxy of AAA (i.e., AAA-proxy). The EV 
then randomly selects another MAG as a proxy of TS (i.e., TS-
proxy) based on the list obtained from AAA at the registration 
phase. As the AAA-proxy MAG has already confirmed the 
validity of the EV’s access pass received, they can follow the 
process in Fig. 3 to get a new pass issued by the TS-proxy 
MAG. The new access pass should bear the same expiration 
time as the current pass. This ensures that when the original 
access pass granted by AAA is expired, all the passes issued 
directly or indirectly from it are also expired, as the EV is no 
longer eligible for further services from any MAGs after the 
expiration time. 
Similarly, the EV can use the new access pass to obtain 
another pass from two different MAGs during a visit to one of 
them before it expires. This means that the EV can obtain a tree 
of access passes from the original pass received from AAA. To 
avoid overloading a MAG with a large number of new pass 
requests, each MAG limits the number of new passes issued to 
an EV to one only, based on a single valid pass. 
The process in Fig. 3 is now applied to elaborate the above 
idea to show how EV1 gets a new access pass passEV1` based on 
its valid pass passEV1 from two MAGs, MAGi as an AAA-proxy 
and MAGj as a TS-proxy. By replacing AAA and TS in Fig. 3 
with MAGi and MAGj respectively, the first stage of the process 
performed by EV1 remains largely unchanged. Here, the 
expiration time  for the new access pass is inherited from the 
one in passEV1. CertEV1 in the encrypted message is replaced by 
IDMAGj, the identity of the TS-proxy, as MAGi has already 
confirmed the validity of public key TPKEV1 associated with 
passEV1. The signature in the encrypted message is signed with 
the private key TSKEV1 paired with confirmed TPKEV1. 
The second stage executed by MAGi in Fig. 3 is still the same 
except that MAGi needs to confirm the use of the same 
expiration time  for both passes. Afterwards, there is no 
change to the rest of the pass generation process. As illustrated 
in Fig. 3, MAGi saves {L`, IDMAGj, PI, t1`, SignEV1`(H(IDMAGj || 
T` || K` || t1`))}, while MAGj records {L`, IDMAGi, PI`, T`, K`, t2`, 
SignMAGi(H(L` || T` || K` || t2`))}, after the generation of new pass 
passEV1` for the traceability purposes. 
From the above description, it is evident that MAGi can see 
passEV1 but not passEV1`, whereas MAGj knows the identifier PI` 
of passEV1` but not passEV1. In other words, neither of them can 
link the two passes together. As only passEV1 is used to produce 
passEV1`, the MAGs cannot see any information on EV1’s real 
identity either. 
Although MAGj has issued passEV1`, it has no information to 
infer that EV1 has been located at MAGi. Also, when using 
passEV1` at another MAG different from MAGi and MAGj, the 
third MAG can see that passEV1` was issued by MAGj, but it is 
unable to find out any previous MAGs that EV1 has visited, as 
the issuance of passEV1` by MAGj does not mean that EV1 has 
visited MAGj. This protects EV1’s location privacy. 
Note that EV1 has the choice of whether to use a new access 
pass after a handover to a different MAG. This decision 
depends on the level of anonymity/privacy that EV1 requires. 
E. Authorised Identity and Location Tracking  
Assume that EV1 misbehaved and there is a legal 
requirement to reveal its real identity and/or trace its 
movements within LMD, and that AAA has been authorised to 
perform the task. Three cases are considered here: i) a pass used 
by EV1 is given as passEV1`, so the task is to trace backwards to 
discover EV1’s real identity; ii) the real identity of EV1 is 
given, so the task is to trace forward for the collection of all the 
passes used by EV1; and iii) all the passes of EV1 have been 




provided, so the task is to find out all the MAGs visited by EV1 
using these access passes. Obviously, these cases can be 
combined to handle other scenarios. For example, given a pass, 
reveal EV1’s real identity and identify all its used passes and 
visited MAGs. In the following, each case is explained in detail. 
i) Here, the main idea is to explore the recorded links between 
EV1’s access passes, which are kept by AAA, TS and 
MAGs as illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. As any pass issued 
by a TS-proxy MAG is always based on another pass 
produced earlier, this link can be established via the records 
saved by the MAG and its associated AAA-proxy MAG. 
Similarly, the earlier access pass can be used to identify 
another one from which the pass was granted. This 
backward tracking process continues until the pass issued 
by TS is reached, which then enables the AAA server to 
reveal the real identity of EV1. 
The above idea is implemented by the following steps. 
a) Suppose that the correctness of the given access pass 
passEV1` = {IDMAGj, M`, TPKEV1`, `, , PI`} has been 
confirmed. AAA then sends a signed request to TS-
proxy MAGj, which issued passEV1`, for its saved 
record with identifier PI` listed in passEV1`. The 
message is expressed as PKE(PKMAGj, {PI`, t9, 
SignAAA(H(PI` || t9))}). 
b) After the successful decryption and validation of the 
received request, MAGj searches its records based on 
given PI`. As MAGj issued passEV1`, it should have the 
record Rj ={L`, IDMAGi, PI`, T`, K`, t2`, SignMAGi(H(L` || 
T` || K` || t2`))}, as presented in Section V-D. MAGj 
then sends the record back to AAA as PKE(PKAAA, {Rj, 
t10, SignMAGj(H(Rj || t10))}). 
c) Upon receipt of MAGj’s response, AAA decrypts the 
message and confirms the presence of PI` in the 
message as well as the message validity via SignMAGj. 
It then verifies SignMAGi in received Rj to assure its 
correctness. Afterwards, based on MAGi’s identity 
IDMAGi and its label L` listed in Rj, AAA transfers a 
signed request to MAGi for its stored record labelled 
with L`, which is represented as PKE(PKMAGi, {L`, t11, 
SignAAA(H(L` || t11))}). 
Note that for any failure of AAA’s verifications, it 
asks MAGj to re-transmit its record. As assumed in 
Section IV-C, MAGs always keep correct records 
required. Hence, if MAGj has operated normally, AAA 
should eventually receive the correct record requested. 
However, it is possible that MAGj is compromised and 
issued the pass to EV1 illicitly without a valid request 
from an AAA-proxy MAG. In this case, MAGj would 
fail to provide a valid record to AAA. Thus, the 
traceability of ESP-PMIPV6 is to hold MAGj 
accountable for the misbehaviour of EV1. This 
problem can be mitigated by using multiple TS-proxy 
MAGs to jointly issue a pass, which is not covered in 
this paper. The above discussion also applies to AAA-
proxy MAGs. 
d) After the decryption and validity confirmation of 
AAA’s request, MAGi uses received L` to locate its 
record Ri = {L`, IDMAGj, PI, t1`, SignEV1`(H(IDMAGj || T` 
|| K` || t1`))}. As stated in Section V-D, MAGi accepted 
EV1’s pass generation request only after its successful 
attachment to MAGi. This means that MAGi has 
another saved record Ri` = {PID1, passEV1, t5, 
SignEV1`(H(PID1 || passEV1 || t5))} for EV1 as defined in 
Fig. 4, where PI in Ri also appears in passEV1 = {IDTS, 
M, TPKEV1, , , PI}. Hence, MAGi used PI to find 
Ri`. Afterwards, it sends its signed response 
PKE(PKAAA, {Ri, Ri`, t12, SignMAGi(H(Ri || Ri` || t12))}) to 
AAA. 
e) Having decrypted and verified MAGi’s message 
successfully, AAA examines the validity of SignEV1` 
and passEV1 in received Ri`. It also confirms the 
correctness of the signature in Ri using items T` and K` 
in Rj received earlier from MAGj. 
After the successful completion of the above 
verifications, AAA uses passEV1 to repeat above steps a) 
and b) to obtain a record RTS = {L, IDAAA, PI, T, K, t2, 
SignAAA(H(L || T || K || t2))} from the issuer TS of passEV1. 
Based on label L in RTS, AAA can locate its record RAAA = 
{L, IDTS, IDEV1, t1, SignEV1(H(CertEV1 || T || K || t1))} to reveal 
the real identity IDEV1 of EV1. In the case where passEV1 
was not produced by TS, AAA applies passEV1 to repeat 
steps a) to e). This process continues until the pass issued 
by TS is found.    
ii) To handle the second case, the above process needs to be 
reversed. That is, given the real identity IDEV1 of EV1, 
AAA gets hold of its record RAAA and uses label L in RAAA 
to request record RTS from TS in similar ways to those 
described in step e) above. AAA then extracts the identifier 
PI of EV1’s first pass passEV1 from RTS. Afterwards, it 
sends a signed request to all the MAGs for passes issued 
for identifier PI. The formal message definition is omitted 
hereafter, as it is similar to those used in the first case. 
Upon receipt of the request, every AAA-proxy MAG 
checks its records based on received PI. Similar to step d), 
if two records are identified, the MAG sends them to AAA. 
If no records are received after a set period, AAA 
concludes that EV1 has not requested any extra pass from 
MAGs. Otherwise, for the records received from each 
MAG, one of them contains EV1’s access pass, and the 
other records its pass generation request including the 
corresponding TS-proxy identity and a label. The identity 
and the label allow AAA to acquire a record from the TS-
proxy MAG in similar ways to steps a) to c). This record 
contains the identifier of the pass issued by the TS-proxy 
MAG. After the collection of all such identifiers, AAA 
broadcasts them to all the MAGs for gathering further 
passes and identifiers. This is repeated until no more 
identifiers have been reported. 
Once done, AAA has obtained all the passes of EV1 
apart from those that have not been used to generate other 




passes. Hence, AAA applies a similar way to obtain them 
from the MAGs via a broadcast message. If such a missing 
access pass has been given to at least one MAG for 
attachment, it should be in the MAG’s records as shown in 
Fig. 4, so AAA can obtain it from that MAG. It is possible 
that some of these passes have never been used in any way 
at all, so AAA is unable to get them from the MAGs. In 
this case, the existence of these passes has no help to the 
current investigation. If necessary, they can be barred for 
future use (e.g., via a black list of their identifiers). 
iii) Finally, for the third case, AAA can first run the second 
case ii) to collect all the pass identifiers of EV1. It then 
broadcasts them to all the MAGs. Every MAG, which has 
attachment records associated with some of these 
identifiers, sends the records to AAA. This allows AAA to 
collate a list of all the MAGs visited by EV1 and construct 
a full trace of where and when the misbehaved EV1 moved 
within LMD. 
F. Location Tracking Complexity 
To keep the location tracking complexity and signalling 
overhead low, the number of new passes that can be requested 
by an EV from a MAG is limited to one only, as mentioned 
earlier in Section V-D. Hence, the maximum number of access 
passes obtained by an EV is limited to the number of MAGs it 
attaches to in LMD. While allowing an EV to acquire more 
access passes means higher anonymity levels, its impact will be 
higher loads on MAGs and a higher signalling overhead to track 
an EV. Therefore, this assumption keeps the balance between 
the EV’s level of anonymity and location tracking complexity. 
On the other hand, since access passes are limited by an 
expiration time , the search for records at MAGs, AAA and 
TS can be optimised to target the date when that pass was 
issued. Consequently, location tracking complexity is kept low 
and the number of messages among AAA, MAGs and TS is also 
kept minimum. 
G. ESP-PMIPv6 Scalability 
As stated in section IV-A and illustrated in Fig. 2, the system 
model considered in this work is limited to a city and explicitly 
targets personal EVs. It is also assumed that one TS exists to 
serve the ESP-PMIPv6 objectives. However, scalable mobile IP 
management in V2G networks is of paramount importance 
especially when the number of EVs increases. Hence, the 
scalability of ESP-PMIPv6 is discussed herein to show that the 
assumption of one TS in a LMD is reasonable in this context, 
and the ESP-PMIPv6 is scalable and can be extended to more 
than one city. The following three cases are considered: 
1) Intra-LMD Scalability with one TS and one AAA server. 
Assume a large city such as Liverpool, UK that has a 
population of 469230 [35] and a ratio of 323 cars/vans per 
1000 people [36] (i.e., an estimate of 151561 cars/vans in 
the city). Assume that all these cars/vans are personal EVs 
and one V2G network exists in the city. Moreover, assume 
that all EVs require their access passes at the same time 
(i.e., they request the access pass generation described in 
Section V-B simultaneously). According to Fig. 3, the 
cryptographic operations conducted at the AAA server and 
TS would take approximately 11ms using the speed 
benchmarks of RSA-2048 [37] on a CPU frequency equals 
to 2.7e+09 Hz. Therefore, serving all the EVs’ requests 
would take approximately 28 minutes assuming requests 
are processed sequentially one by one. In reality, servers 
can process multiple requests in parallel, so the time could 
be reduced significantly. 
Note that the assumptions above (i.e., all cars/vans are 
personal EVs and requesting the pass generation at the 
same time) are exaggerated to show the worst-case 
scenario. The probability of all EVs asking for the pass 
generation at the same time is very slim, given that  is 
limited to 24 hours and can be chosen to be less than that. 
Even in the worst-case scenario, the protocol’s total 
processing time is reasonable and can be considerably 
shortened by employing powerful servers. 
2) Intra-LMD Scalability with multiple TSs and AAA servers. 
As noted in the messages in Fig. 3, the identity of the TS is 
included in the record saved by the AAA, and similarly the 
identity of the AAA is kept in the record stored by the TS. 
Hence, the use of multiple TSs within a LMD is envisioned 
in the ESP-PMIPv6 protocol design to handle a high 
volume of requests for access passes in the same way as the 
pass issuance by MAGs (see Section V-D). This scalability 
helps to expand the coverage of a LMD to more than one 
city. 
3) Inter-LMD Scalability. From the above case of multiple 
TSs and AAA servers, it is evident that the proposed ESP-
PMIPv6 protocol can also be applied to multiple LMDs, 
assuming that the certified long-term public keys of all the 
entities involved in the protocol are valid and their 
associated signatures can be verified across different 
LMDs. However, there are some issues of security, 
privacy, roaming agreements, and synchronisation among 
LMAs’ records in different LMDs when an EV crosses 
several LMDs using different access passes. A 
comprehensive investigation of these issues is outside the 
scope of this paper and is left for future work. 
VI. SECURITY & PRIVACY ANALYSIS 
A. Mutual Authentication Formal Validation with BAN Logic 
In the following, BAN logic is utilised to validate the mutual 
authentication property of the ESP-PMIPv6 protocol. BAN 
logic, named after its developers: Mike Burrows, Martín Abadí, 
and Roger Needham in [32], is based on model logic and uses 
logical postulates and definitions to analyse authentication 
protocols. This allows the assumptions and goals of an 
authentication protocol to be abstractly stated in belief logic. 
According to BAN logic, an authentication protocol is proved 
successful if the belief state of the communicating entities, after 
running the protocol, contains the protocol goals. Table II 
shows the notation used in BAN logic for the ESP-PMIPv6 
proof below. 




The following logical postulates are also defined to be used 
in the proof: 
𝑃 |≡ 𝑃 
𝐾
↔ 𝑄,   𝑃 ⊲ {𝑋}𝐾   
𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |~ 𝑋
          (1) 
meaning that if P believes that K is a secret key shared with Q 
and P sees X encrypted with K, then P believes that Q has once 
said X.  
𝑃 |≡ 
𝐾
→𝑄,   𝑃 ⊲ {𝑋}𝐾−1   
𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |~ 𝑋
          (2) 
meaning that if P believes that K is a public key of Q and P sees 
X encrypted with K-1, then P believes that Q has once said X. 
𝑃 |≡ 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ(𝑋),   𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |~ 𝑋 
𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |– 𝑋
        (3) 
meaning that if P believes that X is fresh and recent, and P 
believes that Q has once said X, then P believes that Q still 
believes X (i.e., Q said X in the current run). 
𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 ⇒ 𝑋,   𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |≡ 𝑋 
𝑃 |≡ 𝑋
         (4) 
meaning that if P believes that Q has complete control over X 
and P believes that Q believes X, then P believes X (i.e., P trusts 
Q on the truth of X).   
𝑃 |≡(𝑋,𝑌) 
𝑃 |≡ 𝑋,   𝑃 |≡ 𝑌
             (5) 
meaning that if P believes in a message consisting of X and Y, 
then P believes X and P believes Y.  
𝑃 |≡ 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ(𝑋) 
𝑃 |≡ 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ(𝑋,𝑌)
            (6) 
meaning if P believes that X, part of a message, is fresh, then P 
believes that the entire message (X, Y) is fresh. 
Following the notation in Fig. 3, the following messages are 
given for the full run of the protocol: 
ℳ1: EV1 → AAA: {CertEV1, T, K, t1, {H(CertEV1 || T || K || t1)}PKEV1-1 }PKAAA 
ℳ2: AAA → TS: {L, T, K, t2, {H(L || T || K || t2)}PKAAA-1  }PKTS 
ℳ3: TS → AAA: {L, Resp, t3, {H(L || Resp || t3)}PKTS-1  }PKAAA 
ℳ4: AAA → EV1: {CertAAA, t4, Resp, {H(CertAAA || Resp || t4)}PKAAA-1 }PKEV1 
In the following, the security goal of ESP-PMIPv6 in 
achieving mutual authentication among the entities is proven: 
i)   Mutual authentication between EV1 and AAA. To achieve 
this aim, two objectives can be formalised as follows: 
O1: AAA |≡ EV1 |– ℳ1 and O2: EV1 |≡ AAA |– ℳ4 
Using the logical postulates (1) to (6) above, the following 
logical steps can be obtained: 
1- AAA ⊲ {CertEV1, T, K, t1, {H(CertEV1 || T || K || t1)}PKEV1-1  }PKAAA  [ℳ1] 
2- 
𝑃𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴→     AAA                  [Assumption] 
3- AAA ⊲ {CertEV1, T, K, t1, {H(CertEV1 || T || K || t1)}PKEV1-1  }      [1, 2]  
4- AAA |≡ EV1 |~ {H(CertEV1 || T || K || t1)}           [3, (2)] 
5- AAA |≡ EV1 |~ {CertEV1, T, K, t1}                      [4] 
6- AAA |≡ fresh({CertEV1, T, K, t1})             [3, 4, 5] 
7- AAA |≡ fresh({CertEV1, T, K, t1, {H(CertEV1 || T || K || t1)}})  [6, (6)] 
8 - AAA |≡ EV1 |– ℳ1                   [7, (3)] 
Hence, O1 is proved. Similarly, O2 can be proved using the 
same logic above. Therefore, ESP-PMIPv6 achieves mutual 
authentication between EV1 and AAA.  
ii)   Mutual authentication between EV1 (also AAA) and TS. To 
achieve this aim, two objectives can be formalised as follows: 
O3: TS |≡ EV1 |– {T, K} and O4: EV1 |≡ TS |– {Resp} 
Using the logical postulates (1) to (6), the following 
derivation can be obtained: 
1- TS ⊲ {L, T, K, t2, {H(L || T || K || t2)}PKAAA-1  }PKTS        [ℳ2] 
2- 
𝑃𝐾𝑇𝑆→  TS                   [Assumption] 
3- TS ⊲ {L, T, K, t2, {H(L || T || K || t2)}PKAAA-1  }            [1, 2]  
4- TS |≡ AAA |~ {H(L || T || K || t2)}               [3, (2)] 
5- TS |≡ AAA |~ {L, T, K, t2}                                    [4] 
6- TS |≡ EV1 |~ {T, K}                [5, (4), (5)] 
7- TS |≡ fresh({L, T, K, t2})                 [3, 4, 5] 
8- TS |≡ fresh({L, T, K, t2, {H(L || T || K || t2)})        [7, (6)] 
9- TS |≡ AAA |– ℳ2                    [8, (3)] 
10 - TS |≡ EV1 |– {T, K}                  [6, 8, 9] 
Hence, O3 is proved. Similarly, O4 is proved as follows: 
1- EV1 ⊲ {CertAAA, t4, Resp, {H(CertAAA || Resp || t4)}PKAAA-1  }PKEV1  [ℳ4] 
2- EV1 |≡ AAA |– M4                     [O2] 
3- EV1 |≡ TS |~ Resp                 [2, (4), (5), (1)] 
4- AAA |≡ fresh(Resp)                          [ℳ3] 
5- EV1 |≡ fresh(Resp)                    [4, (4)] 
6-  EV1 |≡ TS |– {Resp}                   [5, (3)] 
Therefore, ESP-PMIPv6 achieves mutual authentication 
between EV1 (also AAA) and TS. The achievement of mutual 
authentication of ESP-PMIPv6 between EV1 and MAG1 (and 
MAG2) can be proven similarly using the steps taken in this 
sub-section. The proof is omitted due to limited space. 
B. Mutual Authentication – Informal Proof 
In Fig. 3, EV1 sends its identity information via its public 
key certificate CertEV1 to AAA in step 1 for the initiation of an 
access pass generation process. Consequently, AAA 
authenticates EV1 and verifies its request for a pass by checking 
its signature SignEV1 with the public key in CertEV1. Similarly, 
TABLE II – NOTATIONS IN BAN LOGIC FOR ESP-PMIPV6 VALIDATION 
P |≡ X P believes X (or P believes that X holds) 
P ⊲ X P sees X  
P |~ X P has once said X 
P |– X   P said X in the current run 
P ⇒ X P has complete control over X 
fresh(X) X is fresh and recent  
P 
𝐾
↔ Q P and Q share a secret key K 
𝐾
→P P has K as a public key and its corresponding 
private key is K-1, which is only known to P 
P 
𝑋
⇔ Q X is a secret known only to P and Q 
{X}K  X is encrypted under the key K 
 
 




for each subsequent step there is a signature involved to allow 
the message recipient to verify the message authenticity, as 
defined in Fig. 3. Particularly, TS’s signature in the last 
message received by EV1 enables it to authenticate that TS has 
indeed issued the pass. 
In addition, as illustrated in Fig. 4, when EV1 attaches to 
MAG1, it sends its passEV1 and a signature SignEV1` yielded 
using private key TSKEV1 paired with public key TPKEV1 tied to 
passEV1. This allows MAG1 to authenticate that EV1 is the right 
user of the pass and hence authorised to join LMD. When 
MAG1 replies with the RA message, EV1 can authenticate 
MAG1 through its CertMAG1 and SignMAG1 in the message. 
It can be noticed, from Fig. 3, that neither TS nor AAA saves 
the generated access pass (i.e., passEV1) of EV1. In fact, AAA 
cannot form passEV1, because it does not even have the blind 
signature σ signed by TS, which is a crucial part of the pass 
issuance. On the other hand, although TS creates σ, it does not 
have the blind factor r that is essential for the calculation of 
signature  in passEV1. Thus, even if AAA or TS is 
compromised, the pass cannot be stolen from them for 
impersonation attacks. 
Finally, assume that MAG1 is compromised and passEV1 is 
stolen by an attacker. Then the stolen pass cannot be used to 
access LMD, because the attacker still needs EV1’s temporary 
private key TSKEV1 known only by EV1, to use passEV1. Thus, it 
defeats impersonation attacks. 
C. EV’s Anonymity & Location Privacy  
To illustrate this property, the possibilities of revealing the 
identity and/or tracking the locations of a given EV, denoted as 
EV1, by each of the system entities are discussed below: 
1) As stated before, both AAA and TS do not save passEV1 and 
cannot produce it either. Instead, AAA records {L, IDTS, 
IDEV1, t1, SignEV1(H(CertEV1 || T || K || t1))}, while TS keeps 
{L, IDAAA, PI, T, K, t2, SignAAA(H(L || T || K || t2))}, as shown 
in Fig. 3. Thus, neither AAA nor TS are aware of when and 
where EV1 will use its access pass. Those saved records 
are not sufficient to track EV1 unless both AAA and TS 
collude directly with MAGs for such an illicit operation. 
As assumed in the threat model in Section IV-C, they do 
not have such collusion. 
2) A pair of MAGs, MAGi and MAGj, can be used as the 
proxies of AAA and TS by EV1 to get a new access pass 
passEV1` from its existing pass passEV1. As pointed out in 
Section V-D, this pass generation process involves no 
information on EV1’s real identity, and neither of the two 
MAGs can link the two passes together. MAGj is unaware 
that EV1 is located at MAGi, and any other MAG cannot 
infer from passEV1` that EV1 has visited MAGi. Even if 
both MAGi and MAGj collude, the only gain is to establish 
the link between the two passes and let MAGj know EV1’s 
location at MAGi. However, if EV1 has no intention to visit 
MAGj or visits it with a different pass, the collusion gives 
them no benefit in terms of revealing EV1’s real identity 
and linking its different locations. Obviously, to establish a 
linkage to EV1’s other locations, MAGi and MAGj have to 
collude with the other MAGs that EV1 has visited or will 
visit. Thus, the more access passes EV1 has, the more 
difficult for such collusion to work. 
3) A MAG cannot spot the real identity of EV1 when it 
receives any of EV1’s passes, as each access pass only 
contains an identifier bearing no link to EV1’s real identity. 
The only way to reveal EV1’s real identity is for the MAG 
to collude directly with AAA and TS. Again, it is already 
assumed that such collusion is not feasible. 
4) All the messages between EV1 and MAG1 (or MAG2) in 
Fig. 4 are encrypted. Thus, the utilised passEV1 cannot be 
disclosed to external adversaries to track down the 
locations of EV1. Even if a given MAG is compromised 
and passEV1 is leaked, EV1 can acquire multiple passes 
from different MAGs as discussed earlier, so it is able to 
use different access passes at different MAGs. This hinders 
the possibility of illicitly linking EV1’s location at the 
compromised MAG to its other locations at different 
MAGs, because the disclosed pass bears no direct link to 
EV1’s other passes as pointed out earlier. 
5) Finally, at LMA, PIDs are utilised instead of an EV’s real 
identity. Thus, LMA cannot track down any of EV’s 
locations as it cannot link different PIDs to the same EV. 
D. Unlinkability & Traceability  
The ESP-PMIPv6 protocol aims to enable the integration of 
anonymity, unlinkability and traceability for providing strong 
privacy protection to legitimate EVs while holding 
misbehaving EVs accountable for their actions. In the 
following, the unlinkability property is illustrated in which the 
ability of LMA to link two PIDs to a particular EV is discussed. 
For this analysis, it is assumed that the system only has two 
geographically adjacent MAGs. Secondly, the ability of ESP-
PMIPv6 to fully trace a misbehaving EV and reveal its real 
identity is illustrated. 
For the analysis of unlinkability, let 𝒩 be the set of all EVs 
in the binding cache entries of the LMA and 𝒲  𝒩, where 𝒲 
contains all EVs that are attached to MAGi and are highly likely 
to perform a handover to MAGj, which is geographically 
adjacent to MAGi. Assume that the arrival of new EVs at MAGj 
follows a Poisson arrival process with an arrival rate λ. Let 𝒳 
and 𝒴 be two discrete random variables with marginal 
probability distribution functions 𝒫(𝓍) and 𝒫(𝓎), respectively. 
𝒳 represents the probability that an EV with a pseudo identity 
PID1 detaches from MAGi, while 𝒴 represents the probability 
that the EV attaches to MAGj with a new identity PID2. In order 
to measure, at LMA, the reduction in uncertainty about 𝒴 given 
that 𝒳 has happened, the mutual information I(𝒳; 𝒴) metric is 
utilised and defined below: 
𝐼(𝒳;𝒴) = ∑ ∑ 𝒫(𝓍, 𝓎) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( 𝒫(𝓍,𝓎)
𝒫(𝓍)𝑃(𝓎)
) ,𝓍∈𝒳𝓎∈𝒴    (7) 
where 𝒫(𝓍, 𝓎) is the joint probability distribution function of 
𝒳 and 𝒴. I(𝒳; 𝒴) can also be expressed as: 




I(𝒳; 𝒴) = ℋ(𝒴) – ℋ (𝒴 | 𝒳),         (8) 
where ℋ(𝒴) is the amount of information that LMA knows 
about 𝒴, and ℋ (𝒴 | 𝒳) is the conditional entropy that measures 
the uncertainty remaining about 𝒴 after knowing 𝒳. Let 𝒫(𝓍) 
= 1
|𝒲|





 is the probability that the EV attaches to MAGj 
after detaching from MAGi, where λ∙t is the average number of 
arrivals per t units. 
Fig. 5 shows the amount of reduction in uncertainty about 𝒴, 
expressed in bits, with respect to the size of 𝒲 and λ when t is 
set to 1s. 
 
Fig. 5. Amount of Reduction in Uncertainty 
Fig. 5 shows that the reduction in uncertainty decreases when 
the sizes of both 𝒲 and λ increase. Thus, in such circumstances, 
LMA stays uncertain about whether PID1 and PID2 belong to 
the same EV even when considering geographically adjacent 
MAGs. In other words, ESP-PMIPv6 ensures high levels of 
unlinkability for the EV at LMA. 
In addition, as pointed out in the previous sub-section, the 
EV’s different access passes bear neither any direct link among 
them nor any indication on which MAGs the EV has visited. 
Also, they show no information linkable to the real identity of 
the EV. 
Regarding the traceability property of ESP-PMIPv6, Section 
V-E has presented the methods for tracking down the real 
identity of a misbehaved EV and collating a list of all its used 
passes and visited MAGs. This indicates that ESP-PMIPv6 can 
trace the misbehaved EV and present its movement within 
LMD so as to hold it accountable for its misbehaviour. As 
shown in Fig. 3 and 4, the EV is always required to present its 
signatures when it contacts the AAA server and any MAG that 
records such signatures. Each of these signatures can only be 
produced with a private key associated with an access pass or 
the public-key certificate (only for contact with AAA) of the 
EV, and the key is known only by the EV. Thus, the collated 
list of its used access passes and visited MAGs mentioned 
above provides undeniable evidence about the EV’s activities 
within LMD. Thus, it defeats repudiation attacks by 
misbehaving EVs. 
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION & SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this section, the performance of ESP-PMIPv6 is evaluated 
through a simulation assessment using the OMNet++ 4.6 
network simulator [33] and the EV mobility model in the 
Simulation for Urban MObility (SUMO) mobility simulator 
[34]. Simulation results of ESP-PMIPv6, PMIPv6 and SP-
PMIPv6 [21] are compared to show the efficiency of ESP-
PMIPv6. 
A. Simulation Setup  
The simulation scenario represents a 10 km2 urban area of 
Manhattan grid where charging spots and MAGs are uniformly 
distributed. Vehicles start their journey from their home 
network and follow predefined routes to workplaces or 
shopping centres, where public charging spots are installed (i.e. 
visiting networks). Vehicles are either fully charged at home or 
recharged on the way. For this simulation, vehicles use WLAN 
connectivity to communicate with MAGs. The CN in this 
scenario represents the billing/charging server in the SG 
domain. The average velocity of vehicles on the roads is 
changed from 20 km/h to 60 km/h. The handover occurs 
approximately every 1 km. Vehicles stop at the charging spot 
for 15 minutes on average. The simulation parameters are 
summarised in Table III. 
Note that the time needed to perform Enc(∙) and hash 
operations is neglected, given the small size of the messages. 
The following performance metrics are considered: 
• Authentication latency: represents the average time needed 
to authenticate and authorise an EV to join the LMD and 
start data transmission. 
• Handover delay: is the average time needed to perform all 
the authentication and authorisation needed when an EV 
switches its attachment from one MAG to another.  
• Packet loss rate: shows on average the percentage of packets 
lost with respect to the packets sent from the CN to an EV 
especially when a handover occurs. 
B. Simulation Results  
Fig. 6 shows the authentication latency for each of the 
protocols examined in this simulation. It can be noticed that 
both SP-PMIPv6 and ESP-PMIPv6 outperform PMIPv6 in 
terms of lower authentication latency over different average 
speeds. Unlike PMIPv6 that must communicate with AAA to 
authenticate and authorise an EV, the use of access pass 
authentication avoids this journey and thus achieves lower 


































TABLE III – SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
Simulation Area 10 km2 
Mobility Model Manhattan grid 
Communication range  100m 
Application Background data packets over UDP 
WLAN connectivity IEEE 802.11b 
Simulation time 60 minutes 
Number of Runs 10  
Number of Vehicles 100 
Average Stop Time 15 minutes 
 
 




computational techniques, ESP-PMIPv6 achieves lower 
authentication latency than SP-PMIPv6. In ESP-PMIPv6, a 
MAG only needs to perform two exponentiation operations to 
verify an access pass. However, in SP-PMIPv6, it needs five 
pairing operations in addition. 
Similar to Fig. 6, Fig. 7 shows the excellent performance of 
the developed ESP-PMIPv6 in comparison to PMIPv6. The 
handover process in ESP-PMIPv6 is performed without 
communicating with AAA. Thus, it saves time and incurs low 
handover delay. Finally, Fig. 8 clearly shows the advantage of 
the smooth handover process achieved by the ESP-PMIPv6 
protocol. It can be observed that the packet loss rate of ESP-
PMIPv6 is lower than those of PMIPv6 and SP-PMIPv6. In 
general, a higher average speed contributes to a higher packet 
loss rate because more handovers may occur. In this case, it is 
of great importance to keep the handover delay as low as 
possible to ensure continuous and seamless data transmission 
between an EV and the CN. 
VIII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, the security and privacy concerns of enabling 
mobile IP communications in V2G networks have been 
investigated. To achieve seamless communications between an 
EV and the SG while protecting the EV’s identity and location 
privacy, the novel ESP-PMIPv6 protocol for V2G networks has 
been developed. ESP-PMIPv6 employs an RSA-based blind 
signature incorporating a built-in tagging technique via access 
pass identifier PI and limited validity  as well as terms and 
conditions TC. This coupled with the new proxy-based 
distributed and collaborative access pass generation and trace-
back mechanisms, enables the ESP-PMIPv6 protocol to achieve 
mutual authentication, anonymity and location privacy, and 
authorised traceability. This has been evident via the formal 
security analysis using BAN logic. Furthermore, the simulation 
results indicate that ESP-PMIPv6 has much lower 
authentication latency and handover delay than the standard 
PMIPv6 and SP-PMIPv6. Thus, ESP-PMIPv6 achieves lower 
packet loss rates and consequently ensures seamless 
communications between an EV and the CN. 
For future work, it is intended to extend ESP-PMIPv6 to 
cover a wider V2G network model and inter-domain handover 
and assess its performance on a real-time testbed. 
REFERENCES 
[1] International Standards Organisation (ISO), "Road vehicles -- Vehicle to 
grid communication interface -- Part 1: General information and use-case 
definition," 15 Apr 2013. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?cs
number=55365. [Accessed 29 Sept 2017]. 
[2] Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), "J2836/1: Use Cases for 
Communication Between Plug-in Vehicles and the Utility Grid," 08 Apr 
2010. [Online]. Available: http://standards.sae.org/j2836/1_201004/. 
[Accessed 30 Sept 2017]. 
[3] International Standards Organisation (ISO), “Road vehicles -- Vehicle-to-
Grid Communication Interface -- Part 2: Network and application 
protocol requirements,” April 2014. [Online]. Available:  
https://www.iso.org/standard/55366.html. [Accessed 30 Sept 2017]. 
[4] Society of Automotive Engineers of Japan, Inc., "Industry Standards," 
Society of Automotive Engineers of Japan., Available at: 
http://www.jsae.or.jp/e07pub/yearbook_e/2014/docu/28_industry_standa
rds.pdf, 2014. 
[5] Z. M. Fadlullah, T. Taleb, A. V. Vasilakos, M. Guizani, and N. Kato, 
“DTRAB: Combating against attacks on encrypted protocols through 
traffic-feature analysis,” IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking, vol. 18, no. 4, 
pp. 1234–1247, Aug 2010. 
[6] Australian Government - Data.gov.au, "Smart-Grid Smart-City Electric 
Vehicle Trial Data - Datasets," 22 Sept 2015. [Online]. Available: 
https://data.gov.au/dataset/smart-grid-smart-city-electric-vehicle-trial-
data. [Accessed 28 Sept 2015]. 
[7] N. Saxena and B. J. Choi, “Authentication Scheme for Flexible Charging 
and Discharging of Mobile Vehicles in the V2G Networks,” IEEE Trans. 
Information Forensics and Security, vol. 11, no. 7, pp. 1438 – 1452, July 
2016. 
[8] A. Abdallah and X. Shen, “Lightweight Authentication and Privacy-
Preserving Scheme for V2G Connections,” IEEE Trans. Vehicular 
Technology, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 2615 – 2629, Mar 2017.  
[9] N. Saxena and B. J. Choi, “State of the Art Authentication, Access 
Control, and Secure Integration in Smart Grid,” Energies, vol. 8, no. 10, 
pp. 11883-11915, Oct 2015. 
[10] H. Liu, H. Ning, Y. Zhang and L. T. Yang, “Aggregated-Proofs Based 
Privacy-Preserving Authentication for V2G Networks in the Smart Grid,” 
IEEE Trans. Vehicular Technology, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 1722-1733, Dec 
2012. 
[11] D.T. Hoang, P. Wang, D. Niyato and E. Hossain, “Charging and 
Discharging of Plug-In Electric Vehicles (PEVs) in Vehicle-to-Grid 
(V2G) Systems: A Cyber Insurance-Based Model,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, 
pp.  732 – 754, Jan 2017. 
[12] Y. Zhang, S. Gjessing, H. Liu, H. Ning, L.T. Yang and M. Guizani, 
"Securing Vehicle-to-Grid Communications in the Smart Grid," IEEE 
Wireless Communications, vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 66-73, Dec 2013.  
[13] H. Liu, H. Ning, Y. Zhang, Q. Xiong and L.T. Yang, "Role-Dependent 
Privacy Preservation for Secure V2G Networks in the Smart Grid," IEEE 
Trans. Information Forensics and Security, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 208-220, Feb 
2014. 
[14] C. Jie, Z. Yueyu and S. Wencong, "An Anonymous Authentication 
Scheme for Plugin Electric Vehicles Joining to Charging/Discharging 
Station in Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) Networks," China Communications, 
vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 9-19, Mar 2015. 
      











[15] H. Wang, B. Qin, Q. Wu, L. Xu and J. Domingo-Ferrer, "TPP: Traceable 
Privacy-Preserving Communication and Precise Reward for Vehicle-to-
Grid Networks in Smart Grids," IEEE Trans. Information Forensics and 
Security, vol. 10, no. 11, pp. 2340 – 2351, Nov 2015. 
[16] M.H. Eiza, Q. Ni, Q. Shi. "Secure and Privacy-Aware Cloud-Assisted 
Video Reporting Service in 5G-Enabled Vehicular Networks," IEEE 
Trans. Vehicular Technology, vol. 65, no. 10, pp. 7868 – 7881, Oct 2016. 
[17] M.H. Eiza, T. Owens, Q. Ni. "Secure and Robust Multi-Constrained QoS 
aware Routing Algorithm for VANETs," IEEE Trans. Dependable and 
Secure Computing, vol. 13, no 1, pp. 32 – 45, Jan 2016. 
[18] M.H. Eiza, Q. Ni. "Driving with Sharks: Rethinking Connected Vehicles 
with Vehicle Cybersecurity," IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine, vol. 
12, no 2, pp. 45 – 51, June 2017. 
[19] S. Gundavelli, K. Leung, V. Devarapalli, K. Chowdhury and B. Patil, 
"Proxy Mobile IPv6", RFC 5213, Aug 2008. 
[20] T-T. Nguyen, C. Bonnet and J. Harri, "Proxy mobile IPv6 for electric 
vehicle charging service: Use cases and analysis," in Proc. PIMRC, 
London, 2013, pp. 127-131. 
[21] M.H. Eiza, Q. Shi, A.K. Marnerides and T. Owens, "Secure and Privacy-
Aware Proxy Mobile IPv6 Protocol for Vehicle-to-Grid Networks," in 
Proc. ICC, IEEE, 2016. 
[22] M-C Chuang, J-F Lee and M-C Chen, "SPAM: A Secure Password 
Authentication Mechanism for Seamless Handover in Proxy Mobile IPv6 
Networks," IEEE System Journal, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 102-113, Feb 2013. 
[23] M. Alizadeh, K. Sakurai, M. Zamani, S. Baharun and H. Anada, 
"Cryptanalysis of “A Secure Password Authentication Mechanism for 
Seamless Handover in Proxy Mobile IPv6 Networks”," International 
Journal of Computer Science and Business Informatics, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 
40-48, July 2015. 
[24] K.-S. Kong, W. Lee, Y.-H. Han, and M.-K. Shin, “Handover latency 
analysis of a network-based localized mobility management protocol,” in 
Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Commun., pp. 5838–5843, May 2008. 
[25] K.-S. Kong, W. Lee, Y.-H. Han, M.-K. Shin, and H. You, “Mobility 
management for all-IP mobile networks: Mobile IPv6 versus proxy 
mobile IPv6,” IEEE Wireless Communication., vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 36–45, 
Apr 2008. 
[26] J.-H. Lee and T.-M. Chung, “Secure handover for proxy mobile IPv6 in 
next-generation communications: Scenarios and performance,” Wireless 
Commun. Mobile Comput., vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 176–186, Feb 2011. 
[27] D. Kang, J. Jung, D. Lee, H. Kim, and D. Won, "Security analysis and 
enhanced user authentication in proxy mobile IPv6 networks," PLoS 
ONE, vol.12, no. 7, July 2017.  
[28] M. Alizadeh, M. Zamani, S. Baharun, WH. Hassan and T. Khodadadi, 
"Security and Privacy criteria to evaluate Authentication Mechanisms in 
Proxy Mobile IPv6," Jurnal Teknologi, vol. 72, no. 5, pp. 27–30, 2015. 
[29] S. Taha and X. Shen, "ALPP: Anonymous and Location Privacy 
Preserving Scheme for Mobile IPv6 Heterogeneous Networks," Security 
and Communication Network, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 401-419, Apr 2013. 
[30] G. Danzis, "Measuring anonymity: a few thoughts and a differentially 
private bound," [Online]. Avaliable: 
http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/G.Danezis/papers/Danezis-
MeasuringThoughts.pdf [Accessed 01 Feb 2018]. 
[31] D. Chaum, "Blind signatures for untraceable payments," in Proc. 
CRYPTO, 1983, pp. 199-203. 
[32] M. Burrows, M. Abadi and R. Needham, "A logic of authentication," 
ACM Trans. Computer Systems, vol. 8, no.1, pp. 18-26, Feb 1990. 
[33] OMNeT++ Community, OMNeT++ Network Simulator. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.omnetpp.org/ (Accessed: 05/20 2011). 
[34] German Aerospace Center – Institute of Transportation Systems, 
"Models/Electric – SUMO – Simulation of Urban Mobility," 29 Apr 2016. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.sumo.dlr.de/userdoc/Models/Electric.html. [Accessed 21 
July 2016]. 
[35] Population UK, “Liverpool Population 2018,” [Online]. Available: 
https://www.ukpopulation.org/liverpool-population/ [Accessed 28 Sept 
2018]. 
[36] RAC Foundation, “Car ownership rates per local authority in England and 
Wales,” 26 Dec 2012. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.racfoundation.org/assets/rac_foundation/content/downloada
bles/car%20ownership%20rates%20by%20local%20authority%20-
%20december%202012.pdf [Accessed 28 Sept 2018]. 
[37] Crypto++ community, “Speed Comparisons of Popular Crypto 
Algorithms,” 9 Dec 2017. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.cryptopp.com/benchmarks.html [Accessed 28 Sept 2018]. 
